Malware attacks on computer systems have increased sharply in recent years. Mitigating the effects of such attacks requires quick response. However, this is hampered by the many layers of anti-analysis defenses mounted by malware code, which existing program analysis techniques do not handle well and which therefore require time-consuming and tedious manual intervention. The overall goal of this project was to develop techniques to automate the analysis of malware executables, and thereby accelerate the process of identifying the internal logic of the malware code. A secondary goal was to develop automated techniques to identify and-where possible, eliminate-anti-analysis defenses in the code, so as to simplify subsequent analysis.
Foundations
Automated analysis of obfuscated malware code requires the application of program analysis algorithms. However, classical program analysis algorithms, which are used in the areas of compilers and software engineering, presuppose that the code being analyzed is immutable. They are therefore inapplicable to self-modifying programs, which includes most malware. To address this problem, we formulated a formal semantics for self-modifying code [DCT08] . To the best of our knowledge this is the only work on formally modeling self-modifying code that makes it straightforward to identify code regions where classical program analysis algorithms can be applied with the appropriate soundness guarantees. It forms the formal basis for our work on Static Code Extraction and Anti-Analysis Defense
Identification.
A detailed description of the formal semantics is given in the publication referenced below [DCT08] . It is available from the Pi's web page (www.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications).
Static Extraction of Malware Code
Most malware code is transmitted in encrypted or "packed" form and unpacked at runtime prior to execution. In many cases, the unpacking routine that restores the code to its original executable form is guarded by various kinds of defensive checks aimed at making it harder to reverse-engineer the code.
For example, such defenses might cause the unpacker to be invoked-and the malware payload to be exposed for analysis-only on specific dates ("time bombs") or when executed in a specific environment ("logic bombs"). The objective of this part of the project was to devise techniques to extract the code via static analysis, thereby sidestepping such dynamic defenses.
We developed an algorithm to statically extract packed malware code [CDKT09] . There are three conceptual parts to this algorithm. First, memory analysis is used to identify memory locations that are modified, and program slicing is then used to identify the unpacker code. The second part then uses the control flow structure of the code to identify-and, where possible, eliminate-runtime anti-analysis defenses. Finally, the unpacker code is emulated in a sandboxed environment to extract the malware code.
We implemented our ideas in a binary analysis tool consisting of roughly 81,000 lines of C code. This system was evaluated on a variety of packed malware code that used both commercial packers, such as UPX and tElock, as well as a number of different custom-crafted packers. In each case, we used a manual analysis to determine the actual unpacked instruction sequence, and compared this with the unpacked code obtained using our analysis tool to determine the extent to which our tool was able to successfully extract the packed malware code.
Our evaluation of this algorithm showed that it could handle a variety of commercial as well as custom unpackers. One engineering issue that posed a hurdle was that of replicating OS-level features with sufficient fidelity within the sandboxed unpacker: this is necessary to deal with unpacker code that makes system calls as part of the unpacking process. This, in turn, limited the extent to which our implemenation was able to handle multi-level unpacking.
A detailed description of this algorithm and our evaluation data are available in the publication referenced below [CDKT09] . It is available from the Pi's web page (www.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications).
Anti-Analysis Defense Identification
As discussed above, one of the steps in the static extraction of malware code is to identify the unpacker code using program analysis techniques. These same program analyses also reveal the control flow 
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Theses and Dissertations
In addition to the publications mentioned above, the research effort has led to one MS thesis [Krishnamoorthy] and one PhD dissertation [Coogan] . We describe their most significant contributions below. 
Kevin Coogan
Executive Summary
Computer malware typically resort to a variety of techniques to make it difficult for others to understand the internal logic of the malware code; these techniques are usually referred to as "code obfuscations." The effect of such obfuscations is to slow down the process of understanding the malware and devising countermeasures. This dissertation investigates techniques to automate the process of identifying and eliminating the effects of obfuscation, and thereby extracting the essential internal logic of the malware code, with the intent of simplifying and speeding up the task of developing countermeasures to new malware. Two different approaches are explored: static analysis, where the malware sample is analyzed without running it; and dynamic analysis, where the malware is executed in a suitably isolated environment and its execution observed. In the case of static analysis, the dissertation describes a technique to use program analysis techniques to identify code that the malware would decrypt when executed, and extract this code automatically without running the malware. In the case of dynamic analysis, the dissertation develops techniques to examine the sequence of instructions executed by the malware sample and identifying those instructions that are irrelevant to its observable behavior and which can therefore be discarded, thereby reducing the set of instructions that have to be considered when understanding the malware code.
Note: The dissertation is expected to be completed by December 2010. At that time it will be available from the web site of the University of Arizona Department of Computer Science, or via email from the PI (email: debray@cs.arizona.edu). 
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Expected Completion Date: May 2010
Executive Summary
When someone wants to understand the internal logic of a malware program, the first step is to take the malware file, which is in a format suitable for execution on a computer, and extract from it a humanreadable representation of the machine instructions in the malware code. This process is known as S disassembly, and all of the work on malware analysis assumes that the disassembly is successful and that the human-readable representation obtained is correct. Unfortunately, in practice disassemblies may contain errors, and the errors may not always be detected by the disassemble. When this happens, the conclusions drawn from subsequent analyses of the erroneous disassembly are also wrong.
This thesis describes an approach for automatically detecting locations within a disassembly that may contain errors. The key insight in this work is that when a disassembly error occurs, the resulting (erroneous) instruction sequence is subtly different from disassemblies that are correct. The thesis proposes an approach that uses machine learning techniques to "learn" how to distinguish between a sample set of correct disassemblies from a sample set of incorrect disassemblies. This results in a software tool that can be used to detect incorrect disassemblies. Experimental studies indicate that the resulting tool can automatically detect errors in disassemblies with a high degree of precision.
Note:
The thesis is expected to be completed by May 2010. At that time it will be available from the web site of the University of Arizona Department of Computer Science, or via email from the PI (email:
debray@cs.arizona.edu).
People involved with this research (in addition to the PI): Nithya Krishnamoorthy, Keith Fligg.
Publications resulting from this research:
1. Nithya Krishnamoorthy, Saumya Debray, and Keith Fligg. Static Detection of Disassembly Errors. 
Proc. 16th. IEEE Working Conference on Reverse Engineering
Software Resulting from the Research Effort
The research effort has led to the development of prototype software tools used for validation and evaluation of the research. These consist of the following:
1. A tool for automatic code extraction from packed malware executables. This consists of roughly 81,000 lines of C code. A README file for this system is given in Appendix 1. The software is available from the PI via email. 2. A tool for automatic detection of disassembly errors. This consists of a total of roughly 65,000 lines of C code. A README file for this system is given in Appendix 2. The software is available from the PI via email.
APPENDIX 1. Online README file for Automatic Static Decryption Tool
The tool described earlier for satic extraction of malware code consists of approximately 81,000 lines of C code. It is not practical to attach this to this report; instead we attach the README file describing this tool. The software itself can be obtained from the PI (email: debray@cs.arizona.edu).
System Requirements and Build
The system is meant to run on linux 2.6.28-13 or higher. The Boehm-Weiser garbage collector should be installed on your system. 
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